I first include relevant quotations taken from the initial Miranda v. Arizona case that first established the procedural safeguards of the Fifth Amendment, as well as short summaries of sections of the opinion with special note given to what I consider to be rather important phrases useful towards indicating the intent of the decision, which intent I agree with in principle.
“The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned.
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This first part of the opinion addresses police interrogation practices. It makes relatively clear that due to the privacy of custodial interrogation, as well as the obvious advantage of training in subtle (or otherwise) psychological strategies, police (prior to this decision) have had a tremendous advantage over any individual suspect in a criminal investigation. They proceed with excerpts from police interrogation manuals as follows,
“The principal psychological factor contributing to successful interrogation is privacy—being alone with the person under interrogation”
The Court’s opinion is made clear like so:
“Even without employing brutality, the ‘third degree’ or the specific stratagems described above, the very fact of custodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of individuals.”
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Citing precedents to their decision, the Court goes on in the second section to say,
“The privilege (to remain silent) has come rightfully to be recognized in part as an individual’s substantive right, a “right to a private enclave where he may lead a private life." That right is a hallmark of our republic (United States v. Grunewald). In sum, the privilege is fulfilled only when the person is guaranteed the right “to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in unfettered exercise of his own will” (Malloy v. Hogan).” (Miranda v. Arizona).
“As a practical matter the compulsion to speak in the isolated setting of the police station may well be greater than in courts or other official investigations where there are often impartial observers to guard against intimidation or trickery” (Miranda v. Arizona).
Finally what follows is my summary of what I view as the primary point of Miranda, which, while it is only one of a series of decisions, is a venerable and respected decision which merits serious consideration as to its motives in any address of Fifth Amendment rights.
The Miranda case establishes several things:
1. All people have a fundamental right as guaranteed in the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution to refrain from incriminating themselves if they so desire.
2. As indicated in various precedents the Court cites, as well as in the police manuals upon which the practice is based, custodial interrogation, even absent brutality, presents problems with the Fifth Amendment (“nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself…” because custodial interrogation by its nature and evident practice is coercive or compelling or has the potential to be coercive or compelling.
3. The decision put in place multifold procedural safeguards, wherein the individual in custody must firstbe warned of his rights and then given the opportunity to exercise these rights, and any indication that he maintains these rights must be honored unless the individual has (trifold) voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived these rights, “Unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.
In this decision, the individual is the focus of protective measures. His protection against self incrimination is his right. Another focus is clearly on purposeful waivers made after meeting at least three required circumstances of legitimacy. A waiver must be made (1) knowingly, (2) voluntarily and (3) intelligently. By implication it would seem to behoove the law enforcement as a simple matter of procedure to offer individuals a physical waiver which they can read, contemplate, and put a purposeful signature of ascent. In the recent case, Thompkins in fact was offered such a waiver, and he knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily did not sign said waiver. Under the suggested guidelines of Miranda v. Arizona, which again have significant merit, this absolutely meets the requirement to have been an “indication in any manner” that he did not wish to be interrogated. At the first sign of any manner of indication that the individual does not wish to be interrogated, there is not to be any further questions. The waiver would have been administrated early in the proceedings, and thus the questioning by rights should have ceased at that point, not three psychologically grueling hours later. The decision of the current Court, that is, that those individuals must unambiguously invoke their own innate rights seems not just contrary to the principles of Miranda, but seems counter-intuitive. The Court would essentially wish to tell me that I must specifically request a “substantive right” in order to possess it. Far from being protective of the individual rights guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, this ruling puts in place procedural red tape between an individual and his rights.
Furthermore, to the common argument that many would make against “criminals rights” which itself is a pejorative term considering the individuals in questions are innocent until found guilty in a court of law, that by providing more work for the police to wade through in investigation we would be allowing murders and rapists etc. to just roam free is simply inaccurate. The federal court system here is making a ruling as to whether the suspects fifth amendment (and sixth) were violated. They are not making a case concerning the actual guilt or innocence of Thompkins because that is a matter for the local state courts to decide. At worst, Thompkins would still face a retrial, and given a retrial, and given enough OTHER evidence, which the law enforcement no doubt possess (for example the fact that Thompkins stripped and abandoned the van in which the crime was alleged to have been perpetrated), there is every possibility that he would be convicted again. His guilt or innocence is not the point. What is the point is that in no way should he be coerced into incriminating himself. To be blunt, Thompkins, overall, didn’t really say very much at all. If the entirety of the case against him comes down only to his taciturn statements under interrogation, than there isn’t much of a case against him. Surely the law officials that conducted the investigation have more evidence, which would still be admissible in court upon which they could convict him if indeed he were guilty.
While there must be a balance between allowing police to do their jobs, and protecting individuals, I think it is wiser to err on the side of the individual. As the Miranda v. Arizona decision put it, “Those who framed our Constitution and the Bill of Rights were ever aware of subtle encroachments on individual liberty. They knew that ‘illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing…by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure’ (Boyd v. United States 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886)”. It is my opinion that requiring such unambiguous, or to be more layman, more official invocation of something considered to be an inherent right of man is just such a subtle encroachment.
